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For all the idealism, and increased aid levels, aroused by the
Millennium Goals and Make Poverty History campaigns, the
literature on the eﬀectiveness of aid ﬂows has entered a gloomy
phase. The most up-to-date and comprehensive recent study of
aid eﬀectiveness, the paper by Rajan and Subramaniam (2008)
ﬁnds no signiﬁcant association between aid and growth in any
region, whatever the lag-structure that is used. This ﬁnding
casts a shadow over the more optimistic results achieved by,
for example, Hansen and Tarp (2001), Mosley et al. (2004)
and Clemens et al. (2004, 2012), all of which suggest that
long-term aid ﬂows, at least since the 1990s, had a positive im-
pact on the performance of developing economies. Explana-
tions of this poor performance contain two major strands.
One, favored by Rajan and Subramaniam (2009), invokes
the purely economic mechanism of “Dutch disease”: aid ﬂows
buoy up the exchange rates of recipient developing countries,
in a manner which blunts their competitiveness and their
growth. Another, associated with Bra¨utigam and Knack
(2004) draws a contrast between short-term and long-term im-
pacts, and suggests that the long-term institutional impact is a
negative one, which over time cancels out any positive short-
term impact. The reasons for this negative institutional impact
are multiple, and include a tendency for aid ﬂows to be used
corruptly in some recipient countries (Knack & Rahman,
2007) and a tendency for aid ﬂows to undermine tax eﬀort
(Gupta, Clemens, Pivovarsky, & Tiongson 2003; Moore,
1998), leading in turn to lower public expenditures and lower
growth possibilities.
In this paper, we pursue the second of these two explanatory
strands—i.e., the hypothesis that aid damages institutions—
with particular reference to ﬁscal institutions. Initially, we re-
turn to the so-called “ﬁscal response” literature of the 1980s,
which linked aid eﬀectiveness to ﬁscal performance. We then
build on this by showing that the composition of public expen-
diture and taxation, as well as their level, is an important
determinant of aid eﬀectiveness. Finally, we seek to under-
stand the political economy underlying the state’s choice of
an inclusionary, rather than an exclusionary, ﬁscal strat-
egy—which, we argue, plays an important part in determining
the composition of taxation and expenditure. Throughout, our
concern is to improve aid eﬀectiveness if that is possible—with
a focus on ﬁscal approaches to that objective—and only
secondarily to measure the size and signiﬁcance of the aid
eﬀectiveness coeﬃcient.1062. THE ARGUMENT: FISCAL DETERMINANTS OF
AID EFFECTIVENESS
Three decades ago, in Mosley (1980), we showed that ﬁscal
performance was a key element in determining aid eﬀective-
ness over the previous two decades. We deﬁned ﬁscal perfor-
mance not only in terms of the level and productivity of
public expenditure, but also in terms of the willingness of gov-
ernments to ﬁnance that expenditure out of taxes rather than
simply out of aid ﬂows, on the grounds that this is a key deter-
minant of the stability and eﬀectiveness of public expenditure.
In that paper, we deﬁned willingness to ﬁnance public expen-
diture out of taxes as “incremental tax eﬀort,” or the degree to
which public revenue as a share of taxation rises over time,
and argued that it was a key element in making public expen-
diture and thence aid more eﬀective. Incremental tax eﬀort is
not an easy thing to generate in a poor country with a weak
state, as politically it is in the short term much less costly to
ﬁnance additional expenditure by asking donors for more
aid than by raising taxes. This poses the obvious risk of “bot-
tom billion” countries being caught in a low-tax, weak-gover-
nance vicious circle, a dilemma explored in particular by
Moore (1998).
However, for those states who manage to escape this vicious
circle—including the countries of the Far East in the 1970s
and 1980s, Russia and many countries of Eastern Europe in
the 1990s and now the “proto-developmental states” of Africa,
such as Uganda and Ghana, in the 2000s—there are important
rewards to increasing public revenues in terms of state-build-
ing. One of them is that one source of potential political insta-
bility, which is volatility in aid disbursements 1 (Bulir &
Hamann, 2008; Fielding & Mavrotas, 2005; Hudson &
Mosley, 2008) is diminished in proportion as the ratio of tax
revenue to aid revenue can be increased. However, a secondonymous referees for their ideas and assistance.
Table 1. Tax Ratio Dynamics (1990 to Present). Numbers in Each Cell Represent the Absolute Number of Countries in Each Category
Low-income
(average tax ratio = 13.2%)
Middle-income
(average tax ratio = 19.3%)
Numbers with static or falling tax ratios 11 (Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Kyrgyz
Republic, Madagascar, Nicaragua,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Yemen,
Zambia, Zimbabwe)
6 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Jordan,
Indonesia, Panama, Venezuela)
Numbers with rising tax ratios 9 (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ghana,
Kenya, Nepal, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
Uganda, Vietnam)
35 (Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, China, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Guatemala,
India, Iran, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Lesotho,
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Papua New
Guinea, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia,
Senegal, South Africa, South Korea,
Swaziland, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay)
Trade taxes share of tax revenue (average 1980–2009; %) 22.1 11.5
Aid/GDP% (average 1980–2009) 11.1 4.0
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), Government Expenditure Statistics, various issues; 61 observations, as listed. “Rising tax ratios” denotes that
the regression coeﬃcient of tax eﬀort (tax revenue/GDP) on time is signiﬁcantly positive over the period 1990–2008. For 13 countries in our sample, no
signiﬁcant trend is observable. A “middle-income” country is deﬁned as a per capita income in excess of $1000 in current dollars in 2009, and a
“low-income” country is deﬁned as a country with a per capita income below that level.
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to ﬁnance public expenditures is that, in proportion as citizens
are free to express their wishes, governments are put under
pressure to improve public services—a pressure which is ab-
sent in the case of aid-ﬁnanced expenditures since taxpayers,
unlike aid recipients, only get what they pay for (Bra¨utigam,
Fjeldstad and Moore, 2008; Haggard & Kaufman, 2008, p.
356 2). Thus, our main story is that, because expenditure ﬁ-
nanced out of taxation is in the long run more eﬀective than
expenditure ﬁnanced out of aid ﬂows, aid becomes more eﬀec-
tive in proportion as it incentivises, rather than substituting
for, the creation of tax revenue, and if we can understand
the political process by which this happens, we will better
understand the macro-eﬀectiveness of aid.
A ﬁrst step in explaining this political economy is to see that
achieving a long-term increase in tax revenue requires an evo-
lution of tax structures. Many of the poorest countries have
inherited, almost unaltered from colonial times, a structure
of taxation which is highly dependent on foreign trade in pri-
mary commodities, and this is inhibitive of development, both
because this category of expenditure does not grow so fast as
world trade or expenditure as a whole, and because commod-
ity trade is more subject to violent and unexpected ﬂuctuation
than other tax bases (Greenaway & Milner, 1991). Therefore,
development of tax revenue, and of the economy as a whole,
may depend on the elite being motivated to diversify the tax
base. Uganda is a notable example. In 1986 85% of its public
revenue was derived, not just from trade taxes, but from ex-
port taxes on coﬀee alone (Uganda, Statistical Abstract,
1987). As a consequence, most other commodity exports were
wiped out, the ratio of taxation to income was only 5%, and
public expenditure was heavily constrained and aid-reliant.
By 1995, the export tax had been eliminated in favor of import
duties, a value added tax (VAT) and various user charges had
been brought in to augment revenue, the ratio of taxation to
gross domestic product (GDP) had increased to 12%, and
Uganda had become one of the fastest-growing economies in
Africa. Table 1, which describes the dynamics of developing-
country tax ratios between 1990 and the present, illustratesboth the fundamental problem and the possibility of escape
from it. As illustrated by Moore in the 1990s, a majority of
low-income countries have been unable to raise their tax ratios
over this period—and have thereby been tightly constrained in
terms of the volume and the eﬀectiveness of their expendi-
ture—whereas a majority of middle-income countries have
been successful in escaping from this constraint. However,
nine low-income countries—the “oﬀ-diagonal” cases listed in
the bottom left-hand corner of Table 1—have managed to
spring the trap. Since, on our hypothesis, being able to do this
holds the key to aid eﬀectiveness, it is of obvious interest to
understand what distinguishes the political economy of the
countries which have been able to escape from those who have
not.
Thus, we see the likelihood of escape from the “low state
capacity, low growth” trap as crucial to aid eﬀectiveness,
and this likelihood as being determined by the balance, within
the recipient elite, between narrowly patrimonial (rent-seek-
ing) elements whose focus is on short-term survival, and ele-
ments whose focus is on the long term and on the putting
together of a broad-based, inclusive “developmental coali-
tion.” What determines the likelihood of the latter outcome?
On this issue, our understanding consists more of case-studies
and improvisations rather than a rigorous body of knowledge.
However, basing ourselves mainly on case-study material such
as that contained in Besley and Cord (2007) and Mosley
(2012), we oﬀer four hypotheses:
(1) Inclusiveness (speciﬁcally in the allocation of ﬁscal
resources) often comes about because exclusiveness has
repeatedly failed to deliver growth or political stability,
and the fundamental institutional changes associated with
its advent are often associated with a learning experience
such as a period of chronic political instability which con-
vinces the elite that “we cannot carry on like this if we
are going to progress.” We can return again to the example
of Uganda, whose National Resistance Movement, from
the early 1990s onward, decided that fundamental ﬁscal
reforms were required to establish the state on a stable
and inclusive basis, which it saw as a precondition for
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because it became convinced from the bloody experience
of the years 1972–85 that that experience would recur
unless long-term reforms of state-building, of which an
overhaul of both tax and expenditure were a part, were
undertaken. However, Ghana, Mozambique and Rwanda
in the 1990s, Sierra Leone at the turn of the millennium,
and more recently Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, and Indo-
nesia in the wake of the shocks inﬂicted by the “East Asian
crisis” in the early 2000s, are all good examples of regimes
which also learned from misery and fundamentally modi-
ﬁed their political systems and speciﬁcally their ﬁscal
regimes in a more inclusive direction to head oﬀ a return
to political chaos. The ﬁrst four of these, being low-income
countries, are countries which escaped from the “tax trap,”
as can be seen from Figure 1. Although some of these cases,
notably Bolivia since 2006, are quite recent and untried, it is
at least a valid working hypothesis that one factor making
for strong, inclusive states is a trauma which makes the
practices which led to previous instability appear patently
unsustainable.
(2) More inclusive and durable political settlements
(including those which make possible an escape from the
“tax trap”) are often facilitated by credible signals of equity
and fair dealing emanating from the elite. One way of send-
ing such a signal is to make an explicit redistributive link-
age between taxes and expenditure, 4 as in the case of
taxes on mineral exports linked to payments to over 60s
and the unemployed in Latin America (as done for example
in Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador). This model has now
also been applied also in Africa, for example by means of
windfall taxes in Zambia in 2008–9 (Cheeseman & Hin-
felaar, 2009) and Ghana; for another African case,
Mauritius, see Bra¨utigam et al. (2008, chap. 6). 5 Such insti-
tutional reforms may be useful in representing taxation as
an element in a social contract with the public, in which
the public is invited to participate in creating the common
good of building up public services, rather than forced to
participate in a coercive and unjust process (Bra¨utigam
et al., 2008) and thereby widening the tax net and making
feasible an escape from the tax trap, as has occurred in,
among the “oﬀ-diagonal” countries of Table 1, Ghana,
Bolivia and Zambia. 6 Another way of creating this kindTax 
composition
Expenditure 
level
Expenditure 
composition
Political factors 
underlying pro-
development and 
pro-poor orientation 
of the elite
Tax level
1
2
Figure 1. Causal links in a model of aid, expenditureof signal is to reform the constitution with a view to its
delivering greater social justice—as occurred in Ghana in
the early 1990s, Argentina and Ecuador in the early
2000s, and Bolivia in the mid-2000s. Yet another is to alter
the mix of public expenditure, as well as taxation, in a
direction which achieves greater equity and reduces military
centrality (i.e., not just the share of military expenditure but
the role of the military in government); we call this the
“social eﬃciency wage” approach, because it reduces social
instability through the payment of a higher social wage, just
as in labor economics, the payment of a higher private wage
(known as an “eﬃciency wage”) increases the stability and
eﬃciency of the labor force (Hudson, Lenton, & Mosley,
2011; Stiglitz, 1976).
(3) Third, the social and political relationships that form
between aid donors and recipients are crucial to determin-
ing possibilities for tax diversiﬁcation and tax yield—and
thence for determining expenditure and aid eﬀectiveness.
As acknowledged by Bra¨utigam and Knack (2004) these
relationships can be both creative and destructive of long-
term ﬁscal capacity, but the balance of their exposition is
toward an emphasis on the destructive element in the
story—through costs imposed by fragmentation of aid
eﬀort between donors, through leakages of aid ﬂows into
corruption, and through the moral hazard problem that,
as they put it, “aid might make governments less likely to
put in place the policy framework, local funds, and trained
personnel needed for development” (Bra¨utigam & Knack,
2004, p. 263), which is in essence the problem already high-
lighted on page [1] above—that if recipient motivation is
“wrong,” aid ﬂows may substitute for tax eﬀort. This is par-
ticularly likely to be the case if the recipient, for geo-polit-
ical or other reasons, knows that the donor’s threat to
withdraw aid is not credible. 7 However, the other side of
this coin is that if recipient motivation is developmental,
or becomes so as the result of an evolution of trust-relation-
ships between donor and recipient (Mosley, 2012; Mosley &
Suleiman, 2006, chap. 7) aid may be used to derive ideas
which enable the recipient to diversify his tax base, and
to hire personnel which enable those ideas to be imple-
mented and the underlying problem of state weakness tack-
led at root, as occurred in (to discuss only cases in the
bottom left quadrant of Table 1) Uganda, Rwanda, SierraWelfare 
measures
(GNP, poverty 
etc)
Aid
3
4
and taxation. Source: Author’s illustration.
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these cases, it was by no means love at ﬁrst sight, in the
sense of the donor’s desire to spend aid developmentally
being immediately matched by a corresponding “long-run
capacity-building” motivation among the recipient elite:
the chemistry took time to evolve, in the cases mentioned,
and of course in some cases it did not evolve at all. 9 The
challenge which we confront in the next section is to repre-
sent the evolution of that chemistry empirically.
(4) Finally, the scope for varying tax and expenditure levels
is of course inﬂuenced by the state of the macro-economy—
when the ﬁscal balance becomes unsustainable, there is
more pressure to raise taxes.
Thus the fundamental process which we are seeking to mod-
el is that the four political economy factors described above (at
least) determine the ability of tax structures to achieve exit
from the “low-income, weak-state trap”, tax revenue contrib-
utes to the determination of public expenditure, and the pat-
tern and level of public expenditure determine the impact of
aid on growth. (To understand the impact of aid on poverty,
we need also to factor in the poverty-leverage of public expen-
diture.) This sequence is portrayed graphically in Figure 1.
We can now embed these ideas within the enormous, and
still growing, literature on aid eﬀectiveness. This literature,
in the 1980s, quickly became aware that the eﬀectiveness of
aid depended on the use which the public sector as a whole,
and not just aid-ﬁnanced activities, made of it (Boone, 1996;
Mosley, Hudson, & Horrell, 1987; Mosley, Hudson, & Ver-
schoor, 2004). However the main axis of this research quickly
became ﬁxated on public expenditure rather than on the
ﬁnancing of the public sector as a whole, and in particular,
of course, on the problem of fungibility—of whether aid ﬂows
tended to encourage or to restrain a movement of that expen-
diture into more productive uses (McGillivray & Morrissey,
2001). The issue of whether public expenditure was being
properly spent by aid recipients then became interlocked with
the controversy over whether policies of globalization and
openness were crucial to eﬀective resource allocation in the
public and private sector and thence to aid eﬀectiveness, as
contended by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and refuted by Han-
sen and Tarp (2001). In the excitement of discovering—sadly
only for a short time—that a secular improvement in aid eﬀec-
tiveness was taking place, the analytical spotlight became fo-
cussed on annual growth data and on the short-term
inﬂuence of policy on these; and some of the long-term pro-
cesses which underpinned that improvement, in particular
the hesitant emergence of “developmental states” in some
parts of the developing world, were in our judgment over-
looked. This is natural if one’s focus is on the short term, since
an increase in taxation, all else held constant, automatically
and tautologically lowers income. However, in a longer term
perspective where state expenditures are seen as dependent
on the structure of institutions, including revenue collection,
which supports those expenditures, those institutions cannot
be overlooked. 10 The purpose of this paper is to explore
whether the performance of the ﬁscal system in this long-term
sense, incorporating the role of revenue-collecting institutions,
contributes to long-term aid eﬀectiveness.3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
The essential story presented above (as Figure 1) contains
three basic steps: the political economy variables discussed
above determine tax structure and the ability of tax revenue
to grow; tax revenue plus other causes determine expenditure;and these ﬁscal variables condition the state’s ability to deli-
ver, and thence the eﬀectiveness of overseas aid. The model
to be estimated consists of these three basic steps, plus a fourth
equation in which aid is endogenous; these correspond to the
links represented as (1) through (4) on Figure 1. Our speciﬁca-
tion of these building-blocks is:
(a) Tax revenue
In essence, the ability of the state to develop its tax revenue, as
discussed above, is determined by its ability to diversify out of
the strait-jacket of taxes on trade, and more broadly by its abil-
ity to confront rather than be bought oﬀ by powerful rent-seek-
ers who pay no tax. We speciﬁed above three elements in the
process by which elites may be motivated to escape from the
tax trap: a political trigger motivating them to ﬁnd a long-term
way out of the trap, a relational environment which provides
them with the technical means for doing so, and an atmosphere
of justice which provides a climate in which social contracts can
be built and an institutional gateway for doing this. Thus:
T=Y ¼ fðDðM; GI; SÞÞ ð1aÞ
where D is a measure of tax diversiﬁcation, representing the
potential for escaping from the low-tax/weak-state trap, and
M, I and S are the political economy factors which, as dis-
cussed above, make such escape possible by providing incen-
tives to the diversiﬁcation and inclusivity of the tax system.
We specify these factors as:
M = “learning from misery variable” = 1 if political insta-
bility in previous year, 0 otherwise—representing the ability
of “traumas” as described above to induce a broadening of
the revenue base,
I = “inclusiveness variable” denoting proxies for public
trust in tax system, namely:
GI = Gini coeﬃcient of (vertical) inequality
HI = indicator of (measures for overcoming) horizontal
inequality
L = indicator of links from taxes to public expenditure
S = social capital—the relational environment between aid
donors and recipients, which inﬂuences the size and stabil-
ity of aid ﬂows. This is inﬂuenced by:
IMF = the volume of IMF and World Bank loans, whose
technical assistance acts as a vehicle for providing recipient
governments with administrative capacity and ideas, and in
particular ideas about how to broaden the tax base, 11 and
also
TR (“trust”)—a measure of the level of trust, or eﬀective
working relationships, between aid donors and recipients.
We proxy this in two alternative ways: a measure of the fre-
quency of interruption of program lending (budget support
loans) by Bank and Fund to recipient countries (TR1), and
a measure of forgiveness by the Bank of slippage on perfor-
mance criteria imposed by those institutions (TR2).
Thus the complete tax equation is:
T=Y ¼ constantþ b1Dþ b2Mþ b3IðG; HI; LÞ
þ b4SðIMF; TR1; TR2Þ: ð1Þ(b) Public expenditure
By the argument presented above and in Haggard and
Kaufman(2008), the ability of the state to expand its expendi-
ture is heavily dependent on the tax base. Expenditure is also
constrained by cyclical factors, as the world economy is dis-
Table 2. Notation
Symbol Meaning Speciﬁcation Data source
G Public expenditure Total government spending by public and private authorities IMF, Government Expenditure
Statistics Yearbook
T Tax revenue Government revenue, from both national and local taxation World Bank, World Development Indicators
Y Gross domestic product GDP at constant prices World Bank, World Development Indicators
N Population (hence Y/N = per capita income) World Bank, World Development Indicators
M “Learning from misery variable,” representing ability of
shocks to trigger diversiﬁcation of tax system
Dummy variable: 1 if political instability in previous year,
0 otherwise
ucdp_loc dataset
GI Vertical inequality Gini coeﬃcient of inequality World Bank, World Development Indicators
HI Proactive government signals to reduce horizontal inequality (eg.
anti–discrimination legislation, establishment of ombudsmen and
other agents of social justice):
L Indicator of links from tax to public expenditure Dummy variable: 1 in years in which export taxation
or conditional cash transfers are used to ﬁnance pro-poor
expenditure, 0 otherwise
TR1 “Trust indicator 1” = ﬂows of expenditure from IMF
and World Bank group to individual developing countries
Budget support expenditure (Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility (of the IMF) (ESAFs) and Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility (of the IMF) (PRGFs)) to countries indicated, in current $
World Bank and IMF, Annual Reports
TR2 “Trust indicator 2” = frequency of interruptions to
IMF/WB aid disbursements
Dummy variable: 1 in years when disbursement of
ESAFs and PRGFs was interrupted, 0 otherwise
World Bank and IMF, Annual Reports
(for period before 1999, data are presented
by Mecagni, 1999, chap. 9)
BD Budget deﬁcit or surplus as percentage of GDP Total expenditure (general government + local government)  total
revenue
World Bank, World Development Indicators
Openness Measure of openness of markets Average openness in eight markets (foreign exchange, labor,
interest rates, inter al.)
Sachs–Warner openness indicator,
as contained in Penn World Tables
Polity Measure of democratic accountability Polity4 index (www.systemicpeace.org)
SEW “Social eﬃciency wage” (Education + health + housing + social protection, less military
expenditure) as a share of total public expenditure (G)
IMF, Government Expenditure Statistics
Yearbook
A Aid ﬂows Grant element of overseas aid ﬂows to
developing countries from OECD donors
World Bank, World Development Indicators
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Table 3. Regression Analysis: Governance, Fiscal Variables and Aid Eﬀectiveness
Dependent variable (1) Tax eﬀort (2) Public
expenditure
(3) Growth (3a) Poverty
(measured as infant mortality)
(4) Aid
Constant 9.10*** 8.63*** 9.30*** 9.04*** 13.9*** 111.1*** 0.97 8.12***
(4.95) (4.65) (9.38) (9.13) (4.00) (15.97) (1.43) (16.79)
Political economy determinants of tax eﬀort
Tax diversiﬁcation 1: trade taxes/total taxes 0.11** 0.13**
(1.97) (2.21)
World Bank/IMF disbursements (£million) 0.054*** 0.053***
(6.08) (5.98)
“Donor social capital index”
Interruption in disbursements
from IMF/World Bank
6.13*** 6.00***
(4.10) (3.97)
End of conﬂict dummy 0.73 1.06
(0.76) (1.09)
Determinants of government expenditure
Tax/GDP ratio 0.44*** 0.45***
(4.11) (4.23)
Budget surplus/deﬁcit 0.61** 0.64**
(6.57) (6.66)
Openness to trade 0.034** 0.034** 0.071* 0.13**
(2.27) (2.28) (2.36) (2.11)
Polity 0.056 0.004
(1.18) (0.07)
Determinants of growth
Aid 0.44* 3.29***
(1.86) (5.20)
Total government expenditure 1.15*** 0.92
(4.02) (1.56)
1988 per capita income 0.001 0.0001
(0.64) (0.01)
“Social eﬃciency wage” 0.22 1.90***
(0.84) (3.32)
Secondary school enrollments 0.10** 0.93***
(2.50) (9.53)
Instruments for aid
Population size 0.003*** 0.006***
(4.04) (7.62)
GNP per capita 0.002***
(7.88)
Infant mortality 0.083***
(8.08)
Observations 77 77 77 77 77
“r2” 0.34 0.34 0.70 0.71 0.54 0.83 0.54 0.52
Sargan test for overidentiﬁcation 0.14 0.82 0.43 0.43 0.34
Sources: All data from World Bank, World Development Indicators Compact Disk- Read Only Memory (CD-ROM), plus additional sources noted in
Table 2.
Sample: the 61 countries listed in Table 1, measured over the period 1990–2009.
Variable deﬁnitions are in Table 2.
Notes: coeﬃcients in bold relate to model with growth as dependent variable; coeﬃcients in roman refer to model with poverty indicator (infant mortality)
as dependent variable.
Regional ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all equations but not reported.
*Denotes signiﬁcance of a coeﬃcient at the 10% level.
**Denotes signiﬁcance of a coeﬃcient at the 5% level.
***Denotes signiﬁcance of a coeﬃcient at the 1% level.
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borrowing cannot be increased without increasing the costs of
borrowing and putting credit ratings at risk. Haggard and
Kaufman also suggest that the expenditure ratio—especially
the ratio of social expenditure to gross national product
(GNP)—will be determined by the degree of openness of theeconomy and by the degree of voice and accountability in
the political system. Thus the complete expenditure equation is
G=Y ¼ fðT=Y; BD; polity; opennessÞ ð2Þ
where G/Y and T/Y are as deﬁned above and:
Table 4. Regression Analysis (Two-Step System Generalised Method of Moments (SGMM)): Governance, Fiscal Variables and Aid Eﬀectiveness
Dependent variable (1) Tax eﬀort (2) Public expenditure (3) Growth (4) Aid
Constant 11.17 (5.62) 6.89 (2.37) 13.6 (0.32) 7.64 (2.07)
Political economy determinants of tax eﬀort
Tax diversiﬁcation 1: Trade taxes/total taxes 0.037 (0.77)
World Bank/IMF disbursements (£million) 0.023* (1.80)
“Donor social capital index”
Interruption in disbursements from IMF/World Bank 0.71 (0.72)
End of conﬂict dummy 2.82 (0.71)
Determinants of government expenditure
Tax/GDP ratio 0.93*** (5.33)
Budget surplus/deﬁcit 0.65*** (5.69)
Openness to trade 0.10 (1.10)
Determinants of growth
Aid 0.29** (1.79)
Total government expenditure 0.11*** (2.88)
Investment/income ratio 0.91*** (3.64)
Log foreign direct investment 0.009 (0.01)
Log 1988 per capita income 2.52 (0.54)
Log inﬂation 2.76 (1.50)
“Social eﬃciency wage” 0.00 (0.00)
Log secondary school enrollments 8.68 (0.92)
Instruments for aid
Population size 0.01** (1.85)
GNP per capita 0.072** (2.18) 
Infant mortality 0.24*** (3.98)
Time ﬁxed eﬀects
Year 1 2.06 (1.43)
Year 2 1.33 (1.74)
Observations 338 596 578 1405
Instruments 70 59 55 55
Sargan–Hansen test 1.00 0.75 0.961 0.305
Sources: All data from World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM plus additional sources noted in Table 2.
Sample: The 61 countries listed in Table 1, measured over the period 1990–2009.
Variable deﬁnitions are in Table 2.
Notes: In the tax eﬀort Eqn.(1) regional and time ﬁxed eﬀects are included in the regression but not reported.
*Denotes signiﬁcance of a coeﬃcient at the 10% level.
**Denotes signiﬁcance of a coeﬃcient at the 5% level.
***Denotes signiﬁcance of a coeﬃcient at the 1% level.
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Openness = Penn World Tables measure of openness of
economic system
Polity = Polity 4 measure of democratic accountability.
(c) Aid, growth and other measures of well-being
Aid eﬀectiveness now enters the story directly. Aid is in-
cluded in the growth equation (3) as an independent variable
in a fairly standard new growth theory equation, including in
particular, for ease of comparison, the standard controls used
by Rajan and Subramaniam (2008) and other recent contribu-
tors to the aid eﬀectiveness literature, including initial income,
openness and political shocks. (A variable lag operator appears
against the aid term, since the length of the lag from aid to
growth is one of the key issues of contention related to whether
“aid works.”) The one innovation in (3) is a compositional var-
iable which we refer to as the social eﬃciency wage—the pro-
portion of public expenditures that is devoted to mitigating
social tensions, and thereby protecting the state, as discussed
on page (3) above. We deﬁne this (Hudson et al., 2011) as
the share of public expenditure committed to functions which
increase social equity—education, health, housing and socialprotection, less military expenditure. The social eﬃciency wage
is thus a mechanism somewhat analogous to the social justice
term in the tax equation (1)—it sends a signal of the interests
with which the government is identiﬁed, and of the degree of
justice, or otherwise, with which the elite intends to arbitrate
between those interests. Our hypothesis is that a higher social
eﬃciency wage will induce a greater sense of social justice,
and by thereby moderating the likelihood of political instabil-
ity (Alesina & Perotti, 1996) increase investment and growth:
Growth ¼ fðA=YðtnÞ; G=Y; openness; SEW;
Y1980; political shocksÞ ð3Þ
Other measures of well-being (for example poverty) can be
incorporated by expressing them as functions of growth and
other variables seen as inﬂuencing the poverty elasticity, such
as measures of social equity:
Poverty ¼ fðgrowth; G=Y; Y=NÞ; ð3aÞ
Finally, aid is itself endogenous—in particular to income
levels—(Y/N), as most donors seek to concentrate aid on
the poorest people—and country size. Other standard instru-
ments such as population (N) are also included.
Table 5. Eﬀect of Aid on Growth (GMM Estimation)—Robustness Tests (Student’s t-Statistics in Brackets)
Dependent variable: GDP growth (column 3 of Table 4)
One-step SGMM Two-step SGMM
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Log initial income 0.37 (0.07) 2.48 (0.63) 2.13 (0.58) 0.01 (0.003) 0.94 (0.01) 2.52 (0.54)
Aid 0.26** (2.02) 0.21* (1.71) 0.20* (1.66) 0.36*** (2.74) 0.24 (0.25) 0.29** (1.79)
Investment 0.81*** (3.62) 0.79*** (4.31) 0.79*** (4.15) 0.93*** (4.94) 0.81 (0.50) 0.91*** (3.64)
Log schooling 4.05 (0.45) 7.82 (1.03) 6.89 (0.99) 3.63 (0.61) 5.36 (0.04) 8.68 (0.92)
Log inﬂation 4.05*** (3.37) 3.31*** (2.92) 3.32*** (2.96) 3.72** (2.01) 2.70 (0.87) 2.76 (1.50)
Trade openness 0.095** (1.98) 0.10** (1.91) 0.10** (1.92) 0.12** (1.87) 0.10 (2.12) 0.10 (1.10)
Social eﬃciency wage 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Government expenditure 0.08 (0.33) 0.09** (2.12) 0.15 (0.18) 0.11*** (2.88)
FDI 0.118 (0.29) 0.009 (0.01)
Constant 10.29 (0.08) 10.88 (0.85) 9.13 (0.78) 1.01 (0.04) 4.97 (0.01) 13.6 (0.31)
Observations 616 578 578 616 578 578
Instruments 49 52 55 49 52 55
Countries 52 52 52 52 52 52
Sargan–Hansen test 0.617 0.785 0.884 0.832 0.876 0.961
AR (1) test 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.079 0.076
AR (2) test 0.131 0.128 0.115 0.182 0.300 0.432
Sources: All data from World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM, plus additional sources noted in Table 2.
Sample: The 61 countries listed in Table 1, measured over the period 1990–2009.
Notes: Figures in brackets underneath coeﬃcients are Student’s t-statistics; t-statistics derived from Huber–White standard errors are reported in the case
of the one-step SGMM, and Windmeijer-corrected t-statistics in the case of the two-step SGMM, AR (1) and AR (2) respectively. AR (1) and AR (2) are
respectively Arellano–Bond’s ﬁrst- and second-order autocorrelation tests. The Hansen J-statistic reports the p-values for the null of instrument validity.
Regional and time ﬁxed eﬀects are included in the regression but not reported.
*Denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level respectively.
**Denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level respectively.
***Denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level respectively.
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A list of all the variables in the model and their sources is set
out in Table 2.
Although this model is portrayed as a linear sequence, there
are numerous linkages going in the opposite direction—i.e.,
tax receipts and aid itself are both endogenous to growth.
Hence, as normal, we estimate the system (1)–(4) by instru-
mental variables methods, using both three-stage least squares
(3SLS) (in order to portray the separate interactions within the
model) and, for ease of comparison, the same Generalised
Method of Moments (GMM) speciﬁcation as used by Rajan
and Subramaniam (2008) to estimate their model.
Table 3 presents the results from the three-stage least
squares speciﬁcation, which has the merit of portraying all
of the causal relationships in the system as separate equations.
This suggests (Eqn. (1)) that tax structure (the share of trade
taxes in total tax revenue), the dummy variable for interrup-
tions in the ﬂow of loans from the IMF and World Bank (con-
sidered as a measure of the quality of trust-relationships
between donor and recipient institutions) and, most of all,
the ﬂow of loans from the IMF and World Bank itself, consid-
ered as a proxy for technical assistance in the provision of
both ideas for tax design and in laying the groundwork for
the administration of new taxes, 12 exercise a signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence on the level of tax eﬀort (measured here as the tax/GDP
ratio). Tax eﬀort in turn (Eqn. (2)) exercises signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence on the ratio of expenditure to GDP, and within this sys-
tem of relationships, aid has a weakly signiﬁcant (at the 10%
level) inﬂuence on growth (Eqn. (3)) and a stronger “positive”
inﬂuence 13 on the infant mortality measure of poverty (Eqn.
(4)). In the light of the emphasis of recent literature on captur-
ing the lags in the system, it is necessary to examine therelationship between growth and lagged aid, as well as current
aid. Here the news is less good: when aid is lagged, the positive
correlation between aid and growth, although still present,
loses its signiﬁcance. 14
It is important to understand how robust these results are,
and in order to achieve this, an obvious way to progress is
to estimate the system of equations by the “system GMM”
method, which has been commended on econometric
grounds by Roodman (2006) and is also that used by Rajan
and Subramaniam (2008) to generate their rather skeptical
results on aid eﬀectiveness and also by Arndt, Jones, and
Tarp (2009) and Minoiu and Reddy (2010) to generate their
more sanguine results. Table 4 illustrates the results from
estimating equations (1)–(3), (3a) and (4) by system GMM
methods.
Both the Sargan–Hansen test and the autoregressive (AR)
(2) test for over-identiﬁcation are comfortably passed in these
runs of the model. The results do not signiﬁcantly vary from
those reported in Table 3: in particular, the link from tax
structure to tax yield to government expenditure to aid eﬀec-
tiveness remains in position, albeit it must be emphasized that
the coeﬃcient of aid on growth remains only weakly signiﬁ-
cant, at just under the 10% level. In Table 5, we check the
robustness of this growth equation by estimating it, in alterna-
tive speciﬁcations, both in a one-step formulation in which the
error term is homoscedastic, as well as a two-step formulation
in which, as in Table 4, heteroscedasticity is allowed and con-
trolled for.
Except in one run of the model, in which government expen-
diture but not foreign direct investment appears on the left-
hand side, aid continues to be a weakly signiﬁcant determinant
of growth.
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We have examined aid eﬀectiveness through the lens of the
link from tax structure, to tax eﬀort, to expenditure possibil-
ities, to growth. Our interpretation remains essentially the
one put forward thirty years ago as Mosley (1980)—namely
that, for poorer developing countries, tax eﬀort, as an impor-
tant indicator of institutional structure, is an important ele-
ment in determining the ability of a country to transform
itself into a developmental state, and thence in determining
that country’s capacity for growth; and that it is therefore vi-
tal, if one is to understand the relative eﬀectiveness of aid in
relation to growth, to examine the linkage going from tax
structures to growth to aid, as well as the linkage going in
the reverse direction from aid to tax structures, as examined
for example by Bra¨utigam and Knack (2004). In our view,
the impact of aid on tax is much more complex than the sim-
ple crowding out eﬀect visualized by Bra¨utigam and Knack
when they say (2004, p. 256) “large amounts of aid and
the way it is delivered make it more diﬃcult for good gover-
nance to develop. . . because of the way aid aﬀects institutions
in weak states.” Our view is that sometimes this is true and
sometimes it is not, depending on the underlying political
economy of the recipient state and the chemistry that devel-ops between the donor and the recipient, but especially in the
case of the IMF we have econometric support for our view
that technical assistance in laying the administrative base
for an expansion of the tax ratio may be in many cases crit-
ical for an expansion of tax capacity. The relationship, in
other words, is a two-way, interactive one, and its outcome
is determined not only by the Knack-Brautigam “crowding-
out” eﬀect, but also by the magnitude of two more positive
impacts, namely the direct eﬀect of technical assistance by
donors into tax design and the indirect eﬀect of aid on tax
revenues via growth.
Our ﬁndings further suggest that the linkage from aid to
growth is modestly signiﬁcant (at the 10% level), and better
in the case where poverty is taken as the relevant well-being
indicator), thereby supporting the ﬁndings of Arndt et al.
and Minoiu and Reddy against the more skeptical position
of Rajan and Subramaniam. These are only preliminary re-
sults, and experimentation with a wider range of speciﬁcations
is emphatically required. But the ﬁndings so far provide ﬁrm
support for the idea that if we are to improve aid eﬀectiveness,
serious study of the strategies used by those countries so far
used by poor countries who have been successful in escaping
from the “low-tax trap” (as listed for example in Table 1) is
strongly recommended.NOTES1. Across a sample of all developing countries for which data are
available, instability of aid disbursements is signiﬁcantly greater than
instability of public expenditure as a whole (Bulir and Hamann, 2008).
2. Bra¨utigam et al. (2008, chap. 6) describe this process by which a
relationship is forged between taxpayers and organs of public expenditure
in democratic states as a “social contract.”
3. See Lindemann (2008, 2011) and Mosley (2012, chap. 5). Note that
Lindemann sees the inclusiveness of the Ugandan political bargain as
being limited to those in the west, southwest and centre of the country.
4. Addison et al. are on this same wavelength when they write (2006, p. 6)
“When analysing the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on poverty, it is tempting to
look solely at the expenditure side. But (their study of ﬁscal policy for
poverty reduction) emphasises the importance of viewing ﬁscal policy in its
totality.”
5. Other cases of export taxation used to increase equity and broaden
political participation are provided by Ghana (Mosley, 2012, chap. 5)
and Mauritius (Bra¨utigam et al., 2008). In Bolivia, the shift to an
“equitable” pattern of taxation was particularly powerful because
previous attempts to broaden the tax net (such as that attempted by the
IMF in 2002) had taken place against a background of extreme
inequity where multinational mineral companies paid next to no
corporation tax, and many high income-earners paid no tax at all
(Mosley, 2012, chap. 10).
6. In Zambia, the new mineral tax regime only came in 2008 (and was
rescinded in 2009, and partially restored in 2011); therefore it has not had
any opportunity to have a big eﬀect on tax ratios yet, and Zambia appears
in Table 1 as a country where no signiﬁcant upward trend in tax ratios is
yet observable. Since 2011 Zambian tax ratios have increased to over 23
per cent, but too late to make an impact on those data.
7. A currently highly topical case of moral hazard is Pakistan, where for
geopolitical reasons donors cannot credibly threaten to cut oﬀ aid, but
where tax eﬀort has always been weak and this weakness is part of the
state’s fragility. At the time of writing (March 2011), another attempt isbeing made to tackle this problem by earmarking much of a large increase
in aid to Pakistan to girls’ education and at the same time instructing the
Pakistani government to address the underlying weakness of its tax
system. See “Pakistan told to make wealthy pay more tax: terrorism ﬁght
at heart of Cameron trip to Pakistan,” Guardian, April 6, 2011.8. For a valuable case study of Tanzania which also illustrates the
interaction between aid, administrative capacity and tax structure see
Morrissey (1995).
9. Critical elements in the evolution of this chemistry of trust-relation-
ships are (1) the willingness and ability of recipients to send signals of
willingness to implement “fundamentals,” in particular a coherent Poverty
Reduction Strategy Programme, (2) the willingness of donors to indulge
slippage on some performance criteria as long as these “fundamentals”
were complied with, and (3) the quality of the underlying personal
relationships and networks of communication, which helped to determine
(1) and (2). For the basic argument underlying the argument about trust
presented here, supported purely by African illustrations, see Mosley and
Suleiman (2006) and Mosley (2012, chap. 7). For a Latin American
discussion of the social and cultural factors underlying the decision to pay
tax, including trust in the tax system, see Bergman (2009).10. Addison, Roe, and Smith (2006, p. 1) argue that “Large-scale aid and
debt relief cannot work without a good ﬁscal system.”
11. Note that budget support provided by the IMF and World Bank is
also aid—thus (1) provides us with a means of incorporating into the
story the idea of Bra¨utigam et al., that tax collection is endogenous to
aid ﬂows.
12. For example, very substantial survey and legal work is required in
order to bring into being a new tax on a base for which insuﬃcient data
currently exist. In order to tax land or any other form of capital, for
example, a register of the valuation of each taxable piece of wealth has to
FISCAL COMPOSITION AND AID EFFECTIVENESS: A POLITICAL ECONOMY MODEL 115be constructed, and in assembling these data and constructing the legal
framework needed to bring the tax into being, external technical
assistance, from the Fund and from other donors, has often been needed.
13. Aid, in Eqn. (3a), is negatively correlated with infant mortality, and
therefore its inﬂuence is “positive” in the sense that it improves well-being.
14. Within an equation structure identical to (1) through (4) above, the
growth Eqn. (3) becomes the following when aid is lagged ﬁve years:GDP growth ¼ 12:54
ð3:83Þ
  0:20
ð1:03Þ
ðaid lagged 5 yearsÞ
 0:84
ð3:24Þ
ðtotal government expenditure=GDPÞ
þ 0:055
ð1:83Þ
ðopenness to tradeÞ  0:0009
ð0:60Þ
ð1988 GNP=capitaÞ
þ 0:19
ð0:74Þ
ðsocial efficiency wageÞ þ 0:071
ð2:13Þ
secondary enrolment rate;
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